with Francesco Giovannoni
Published in Public Choice 131 (1): 1-21, March 2007 (volume lead article) ( PDF )
Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting
in rich countries and corruption the preferred one in poor countries. Analyses of their joint effects are
understandably rare. This paper provides a theoretical framework that focus on the relationship between
lobbying and corruption (that is, it investigates under what conditions they are complements or substitutes).
The paper also offers novel econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and influence using data for about
4000 firms in 25 transition countries. Our results show that (a) lobbying and corruption are substitutes, if
anything; (b) firm size, age, ownership, per capita GDP and political stability are important determinants of
lobby membership; and (c) lobbying seems to be a much more effective instrument for political influence
than corruption, even in poorer, less developed countries.
Download working paper:
IZA DP 3087
Data at WB
Data at EBRD
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