A New Dataset of Labor Market Rigidity and Reform Indexes for up to 145 Countries Since 1960 (LAMRIG)

            with Jeffrey B Nugent

            March 2009

            This paper studies the dynamics of labor market reform across a fairly large number of both developing and developed
            countries. Our point of departure is Botero et al. QJE 2004 which constructed an Employment Laws Restriction Index for a
            cross-section of 85 countries in 1997. Quite a few studies have attempted to up-date similar indexes for large samples of
            countries (e.g., World Bank's Doing Business project, the EU’s LABREF). For going backwards in time, however, studies
            have been limited to two regions (OECD (Blanchard and Wolfers 2000) and Latin America (Heckman and Pages 2004)).
            We develop a de jure index for Employment Laws Rigidity (ELR). The resulting dataset LAMRIG covers up to
            145 countries in 5-year averages from 1960-64 to 1995-99 and reveals sizable variations across regions and over time. In
            order to assess the usefulness of this index we conduct several exercises. First, we restrict our analysis to the cross-section
            for 1995-1999 (the period coinciding with that in Botero et al. 2004) and repeat their analysis concerning the determinants
            of labor market regulatory rigidities. For this cross-section, we fully replicate their results, demonstrating the greater importance
            of legal origins than those of per capita GDP and/or political factors. Second, however, when we extend the analysis to the
            panel and to changes over time, our results diverge from those of Botero et al. (2004). For example, when we use a random-effects
            model with clustered standard-errors at the country level to explain labor market reform, the influence of legal origins is much
            less significant, albeit still present. Third, we test for the relevance of other determinants of labor market reforms, such as economic
            and political crises, structural factors and other structural reforms. Along with the reduced role of legal origins, we find that for the
            role of reform inertia and per capita GDP the type of crises matter, that financial reform seems unrelated to labor market reform,
            and that trade liberalization seem to retard labor market reform.

            Appendix

            For presentation at the IZA-fRDB Conference on "Tracking Structural Reforms," Milan, March 2009

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